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Abstract
The argument that maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations act 
as a ‘pull factor’ of irregular seaborne migration has become com-
monplace during the Mediterranean ‘refugee crisis’. This claim has 
frequently been used to criticize humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) conducting SAR off the coast of Libya, which 
are considered to provide “an incentive for human smugglers to 
arrange departures” (Italian Senate 2017: 9). In this policy brief, we 
scrutinize this argument by examining migratory flows from Libya 
to Italy between 2014 and October 2019.  We find no relationship 
between the presence of NGOs at sea and the number of migrants 
leaving Libyan shores. Although more data and further research are 
needed, the results of our analysis call into question the claim that 
non-governmental SAR operations are a pull factor of irregular 
migration across the Mediterranean sea.
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NGOs’ Involvement in Maritime Rescue
The large number of casualties at sea has turned the Cen-
tral Mediterranean corridor into the world’s deadliest 
migratory route (IOM 2019, UNHCR 2019). 
Source: IOM, Missing Migrants Project.
In response to the rising number of casualties, Italy 
launched operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013, 
using Navy and Coast Guard assets to rescue migrants 
in international waters off the Libyan coast. Criticized as 
“an unintended pull factor encouraging more migrants 
to attempt the dangerous sea” (House of Lords 2016: 18), 
Mare Nostrum was suspended after one year. Ensuing 
European law enforcement and military missions Triton, 
Themis and EUNAVFOR Med have largely refrained 
from conducting proactive SAR (Cusumano 2019a). 
The subsequent gap in rescue capabilities was bridged 
by a host of civil society organizations, which assisted 
over 115,000 migrants between 2014 and October 2019 
(Cusumano 2019b, Cuttitta 2018).
Figure 1 – Recorded Migrant Casualties in the  Mediterranean, 2014-2019
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Source: Italian Coast Guard and UNHCR.
In 2017, Italy’s Interior Minister Marco Minniti took a 
new approach to migration across the Mediterranean, 
offering financial support to Libyan militias in exchange 
for their cooperation in curbing seaborne departures. 
The concern that NGOs could serve as a pull factor 
also prompted Rome to draft a Code of Conduct that 
restricted non-governmental SAR activities, threat-
ening to prohibit non-signatories from disembarking 
migrants in Italy (Cusumano 2018). Matteo Salvini – 
who succeeded Minniti as Interior Minister in June 2018 
– escalated this threat by declaring Italian ports closed 
to foreign-flagged ships carrying irregular migrants 
and enacting a security decree that criminalizes NGOs’ 
activities (Carrera and Cortinovis 2019, Cusumano and 
Gombeer 2019, Camilli 2019a). These measures, in com-
bination with the confiscation of several NGO ships by 
Italian courts, caused non-governmental SAR operations 
to plummet.  Although the formation of a new cabinet 
that no longer includes Salvini slightly softened Italy’s 
stance, European authorities’ approach towards NGOs 
did not change. Indeed, the conclusions of the summit 
between Italy, Malta, France and Germany held in Val-
letta in September 2019 implicitly restated the critique 
that unrestricted NGO rescue operations incentivize 
departures (Camilli 2019b, Ziniti 2019).
Analysing the Alleged ‘Pull Effect’ 
Since the earliest attempts to develop predictive theo-
retical models of migration, scholars have conceptual-
ized large-scale human mobility as the combination of 
negative factors prompting people to leave their home-
land (economic hardship, conflict, human rights viola-
tions) and positive incentives to move to a specific des-
tination. The latter are usually referred to as ‘pull factors’ 
of migration. Scholars have criticized this lexicon as 
overly simplistic (Geddes and Scholten 2016, Castles et al 
2014), developing a more sophisticated conceptual appa-
ratus revolving around concepts like migration networks 
(Haug 2008) and infrastructure (Xiang and Linquist 
2014). However, the dichotomy between push and pull 
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Figure 2 –Migrants Rescued off the Libyan Coast per Organization
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As they enable migrants to cross maritime borders both 
more easily and safely, SAR operations have been sub-
sumed within the rubric of pull factors. As stated by the 
European Border and Coast Guard (still better known as 
Frontex), “SAR missions close to, or within, the 12-mile 
territorial waters of Libya … influence smugglers’ plan-
ning and act as a pull factor” (Frontex 2017: 32).  Such 
operations may “unintentionally help criminals achieve 
their objectives at minimum cost, strengthening their 
business model by increasing the chances of success. 
Migrants and refugees… attempt the dangerous crossing 
since they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assis-
tance to reach the EU” (Frontex 2017: 32).  
Ultimately, this alleged pull effect can be summarized 
by one crucial proposition: all else equal, the higher the 
likelihood that migrants will be rescued at sea and dis-
embarked in Europe, the higher the number of attempted 
crossings. There has been very little empirical analysis of 
this hypothesis. While some preliminary research indi-
rectly supports the existence of a pull effect (Deiana, 
Mahesri and Mastrobuoni 2019 ), various academic 
papers and policy reports dispute  the existence of a cor-
relation between SAR operations and irregular depar-
tures (Heller and Pezzani 2018). In this policy brief, 
we focus on the activities of NGOs between 2014 and 
October 2019. We operationalize and measure NGOs’ 
involvement in SAR by using the following formula:
Using this formula allows us to address the problem 
of reverse causality: a large share of the migrants that 
departed from Libya in the period considered were res-
cued at sea; however, the absolute number of those res-
cued at sea also depends on the total number of migrants 
who left Libya by boat in the first place. To avoid this 
issue, we do not look at the total number of rescues 
conducted in the region, but concentrate on the share 
of migrants assisted by NGOs. As they have operated 
closer to Libyan waters than all other actors, proactively 
looking for migrants in distress at sea, NGOs are espe-
cially exposed to  the critique of incentivizing irregular 
departures, thereby providing a ‘most likely case’ for the 
existence of a pull effect. 
Fig. 3, based on data obtained by combining official 
figures from the International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the 
Italian Coast Guard,  shows how non-governmental SAR 
operations and irregular migrant departures from Libya 
vary in the period considered. The figure shows that 
NGOs’ SAR activity seems only thinly correlated with 
monthly departures. Most notably, this correlation holds 
neither in 2015 nor in 2017.
In 2015, the total number of departures from Libya 
slightly decreased relative to 2014 even though migrants 
rescued by NGOs increased from 0.8 to 13% of the total 
number of people rescued at sea; after July 2017, the 
number of migrants departing from Libya plummeted 
even if NGOs had become the largest provider of SAR by 
far. This suggests that the agreement between Italy and 
Libyan militias reached in July 2017 had a much greater 
impact on reducing departures than the ensuing attempts 
to limit NGOs’ activities.
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maritime rescue in the Southern Mediterranean. Conse-
quently, NGOs  remained the only actor conducting SAR 
operations resulting in the disembarkation of migrants 
in Europe. 
We obtain data on migrant departures from Libya by 
combining multiple datasets gathered by UNHCR and 
IOM, and directly track every SAR mission carried out 
by NGOs from January to October 2019. Throughout this 
period, we count 85 days when one (or, very rarely, two) 
NGOs were operating off the Libyan coast, and 225 days 
when SAR was conducted solely by Tripoli’s Government 
of National Accord (GNA) Coast Guard and Navy, which 
intercepted migrants and took them back to Libya. Fig. 4 
contrasts the number of migrants departing daily from 
Libya with the timing of the various SAR missions by 
NGOs in the Central Mediterranean.
Source: authors’ elaborations on UNHCR, IOM, and Italian Coast Guard data.
Figure 3 – Irregular Migrants Departures from Libya and NGOs’ SAR Operations1
Our exploratory regression analysis controlling for the 
effect of the 2017 agreement with militias as well as 
political instability in Libya suggests no significant rela-
tionship between NGOs’ activities and the number of 
monthly departures from Libya between 2014 and 2018. 
The fact that only monthly data are available throughout 
that period, however, only allows for a small number 
of observations, which limits the robustness of these 
results. This is why we have chosen to focus on assessing 
whether the presence of NGO ships encourages irregular 
departures from Libya in the first ten months of 2019 (1 
January – 27 October). This period provides  better con-
ditions to check the existence of a pull effect for two rea-
sons. First, the availability of daily data allows for a much 
larger number of observations, thereby allowing for a 
more robust analysis. Second,  by 2019 all European navy 
and coast guard assets had disengaged from carrying out 
1 The dotted line shows the average of the multiple imputation models used 
to estimate monthly SAR activity in 2015, when only the total number 
of migrants rescued by NGOs throughout the year was available. As it 
amounts to less than 1 per cent of the total, the number of migrants 
rescued by NGOs in 2014 is negligible. 
% of migrants rescued by NGOs (right axis)
migrants departures from Libya(left axis)
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Figure 4 – Daily Irregular Migrants Departures from Libya and NGOs’ SAR Operations (1 January – 27 October 2019) 
Table 2 –  Results of the robust Poisson regression 
model (with all variables averaged over a 3-day 
period)
DV: Daily departures from Libya
DV t-4 -0.0008 (0.0010)
NGOs2 -0.087 (0.162)
Temperature 0.052 (0.011) ***




(constant) 4.34 (0.47) ***
Day of the week controls YES
N 282
Pseudo R2 0.346
Source: authors’ elaborations from UNHCR, IOM and own data. The blue dots correspond to daily migrant departures, while the gray 
bands show the periods where at least one NGO ship was present at sea. 
Given the uncertainty around the actual timing of depar-
tures from Libya (we count rescues and interceptions 
as they occur, not when boats depart from the Libyan 
coast), we use 3-day moving averages of all our variables. 
The controls of our regression analysis include a lag in 
migrant departures (thereby checking whether smug-
glers send migrants in ‘batches’ independent of other 
correlates), weather conditions (daily average tempera-
ture and wind at Tripoli airport), day of the week fixed 
effects, and a dummy for the unusual dip in departures 
that occurred in April 2019, at the peak of general Haf-
tar’s offensive against Tripoli’s GNA.
2 We use a dummy variable to indicate the presence of NGO ships (1 for 
when NGO ships were patrolling off the Libyan coast, 0 for when no NGO 
ships were at sea). The results do not change significantly when using 
an ordinal variable tracking the number of NGO ships at sea or NGOs’ 
capacity to rescue, measured by the maximum number of migrants that 
each NGO ship can take aboard.
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Figure 5– Estimated effects for NGO presence (left) and changing weather conditions (right), 1 January- 27 
October 2019 
important implications for policy debates.  Drawing on 
the results of our analysis as well as ethical considera-
tions, we suggest the following policy recommendations.
First, claims that non-governmental SAR operations act 
as a pull factor are not supported by the available evi-
dence.  Besides being problematic on legal grounds (Car-
rera and Cortinovis 2019), the policies devised to limit 
NGOs’ activities off the coast of Libya and disincentivize 
SAR operations at large may have indirectly magnified 
the deadliness of the crossing without significantly con-
tributing to reducing irregular departures, and should 
therefore be reconsidered.
Second, the disengagement of EU military and law 
enforcement assets from the Central Mediterranean 
occurred on the basis of disputable factual premises. If 
NGOs – which operate closer to Libyan coasts and lack 
the power to deter and apprehend human smugglers – 
do not seem to incentivize departures, warships deployed 
at a much larger distance from African shores are even 
less likely to act as a pull factor. As governmental assets 
operating farther from Libyan coasts are unlikely to sig-
nificantly incentivize irregular migration and can both 
save lives at sea and prevent undetected arrivals, we argue 
The charts are derived from the Poisson model above, 
accounting for robust standard errors. The figures report 
the 95% confidence interval.
As illustrated, there is no evidence to suggest that depar-
tures increased when NGO ships were at sea throughout 
the period considered. By contrast, a strong correlation 
exists between migrant departures and weather condi-
tions along Tripoli’s coast, as well as Libya’s very high 
political instability in April 2019.
Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that non-governmental SAR oper-
ations do not correlate with the number of migrants 
leaving Libya by sea. Rather than being influenced by the 
pull effect of NGOs’ SAR operations, our analysis sug-
gests that departures from Libya have mainly been shaped 
by weather conditions and Minniti’s policies of ‘onshore 
containment’, which played a key role in bringing down 
irregular arrivals since July 2017. 
Given the limited data available, this study of the alleged 
pull effect of NGOs’ rescue activities has been explora-
tory in nature. Clearly, more data and further research 
are needed on this issue. Nevertheless, our analysis has 
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that decision-makers should consider gradually restoring 
missions combining SAR and border enforcement like 
Mare Nostrum. 
Finally, containment measures taking place in countries 
of transit and departure, such as Italy’s involvement of 
Libyan tribes in the management of migratory flows, 
affect migratory flows to a much larger degree than rescue 
and border control activities taking place at sea. However, 
these externalization policies are deeply problematic due 
to the horrific conditions suffered by migrants in Libya. 
Effective, lawful, and ethically defensible migration gov-
ernance across the Central Mediterranean should there-
fore combine attempts to disrupt human smuggling on 
land with activities aimed both at tackling the push fac-
tors of migration and improving migrants’ living condi-
tions and access to protection on Libyan territory.
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